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1. Introduction
In his engaging 1990’s paper “America’s green strategy”, Michael Porter provided case
studies to support the argument that the stricter a country’s environmental policy, the
more its firms innovate in a profitable way to produce less polluting or more resource-
efficient products; see Porter (1996). Porter and van der Linde (1995) present further
firm-level evidence and put forward that the above argument holds true in a world where
firms do not always make optimal choices, due, e.g., to organizational inertia and control
problems. Otherwise, complying with a stricter environmental policy could never be
profitable. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) called that argument the strong Porter hypothesis,
which they distinguished from a weak hypothesis whereby “the additional innovation
[comes] at an opportunity cost that exceeds its benefits” for firms. They also identified a
narrow version, which makes no consideration about profits and favors direct regulation
(e.g., standards and output ceilings) when pollution requires immediate action.
There have been several attempts in endogenous growth theory to model the strong
Porter hypothesis as one channel of transmission of stricter environmental policy to
growth. In relation to the present paper, a few of them focus attention on the role that the
assumption of profit maximization plays in the strong Porter hypothesis. Jaffe, Newell,
and Stavins (2002) suggest that replacing profit maximization with non-optimizing be-
haviour creates possible improvements in profits. Ricci (2007a), in contrast, recommends
researchers “[not to drop] the assumption of rationality”, that is, the profit maximization
model, under informational constraints on the part of firms’ owners. As far as we are
aware of this strand of the endogenous growth literature, its authors subscribe to the
latter approach by assuming that firms pursue profit maximization in all sectors and
markets.1 Ambec and Barla (2007) suggest to use the Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey’s
(1997) framework which includes intermediate firms in which managers’ decisions about
innovation are better considered as satisficing rather than profit-maximizing.
This paper contributes to the debate on the importance of assuming profit maximizing
firms in models of the strong Porter hypothesis. We relax this assumption regarding the
decisions of managers on the size of innovation. We use the R&D-driven endogenous
growth framework of Aghion and Griffith (2005), which we extend to allow for pollution
and environmental taxation. The tax is paid in the final good sector as in Nakada’s
(2004) endogenous growth model. We think this is consistent with Porter and van der
Linde’s (1995) suggestion that governments should “regulate as late in the production
chain as practical, which will normally allow more flexibility for innovation there and in
the upstream stages.” (p.111).2 Aghion and Griffith’s (2005) model is a special case of
the framework of Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1997) with satisficing managers and
non-drastic innovation, in which owners incur a high fixed cost of production/innovation
which they internally finance. These authors provide micro foundations for satisficing
behaviour in a vintage capital model with managers who discount future benefits and
costs but without environmental regulation. Under these assumptions, intermediate firms
may go bankrupt. Satisficing managers preserve their private benefit of control and keep
1 The microeconomic literature on Porter hypotheses includes various behavioural models of the firm;
see Ambec, Cohen, Elgie, and Lanoie (2013) for a survey on these models. Other market imperfections
are also covered in Mohr and Saha (2008) and Andre´ (2015).
2 Porter and van der Linde (1995) who have a preference for market-based regulation pose the
question of where to impose environmental regulation in the chain of production. We think our model is
consistent with the idea of “late in the production chain”, though the downstream firm does not innovate
in our model.
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their jobs by choosing a size of innovation just high enough to avoid bankruptcy.
Previous endogenous growth models on Porter hypotheses include Nakada (2004)
who allows for pollution and a resource constraint on R&D activities in a framework a` la
Aghion and Howitt (1992). He finds that the “general equilibrium effect” of an increase
in the environmental tax rate offsets the “profitability effect” in the intermediate inputs
sector. In the long-term, environmental taxation enhances growth and reduces the level of
pollution. We calculated the long-term effect of an increase in the tax rate on downstream
firms’ profits in Nakada’s (2004) model. This effect is positive, thus verifying the strong
Porter hypothesis. Mohr (2002) finds results consistent with the narrow Porter hypothesis
in a vintage capital framework with positive spillovers in production, new technologies
which are more productive and cleaner than the old technologies and producers who have
a cost to switch to these latter. At any period every firm can behave selfishly by letting the
others bear the switching cost. Under certain conditions, a stricter environmental policy
(a technology standard whereby all firms must switch to the new technology) alleviates
pollution and increases output. There is a risk in Mohr’s (2002) model, however, that a
benevolent planner finds profitable to let pollution be higher as technology improves. In
Hart’s (2004) model, environmental regulation consists in favouring recent vintages too.
His results also verify the narrow version of Porter hypothesis.
Ricci (2007b) extends the multi-period frameworks of Hart (2004, 2007) by taking into
account flexibility in the technological choice of R&D firms. He analyzes the possibility
that environmental taxation, instead of standards, crowds out old and dirty intermediates
inputs. Unlike in Hart (2004, 2007), productivity growth is negatively affected in Ricci’s
(2007b) model. Among non-endogenous growth models taking up the strong Porter
hypothesis without departing from the maximization model, there is Xepapadeas and
de Zeeuw (1999) who analyze the effect of environmental policy on capital accumulation.
These authors eventually predict the weak Porter hypothesis: although an emission tax
increases average productivity by stimulating the retirement of older vintage capital, the
profits of taxed firms decrease. Feichtinger, Hartl, Kort, and Veliov (2005), who extend
Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) to allow for nonlinear functional forms and technological
change, do not find the strong Porter hypothesis either in their model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present our extension of
the Aghion and Griffith’s (2005) model to allow for pollution and environmental taxation.
Section 3 focuses on the effects of an increase in the environmental tax on innovation,
pollution, growth and downstream profit. Provided innovation is not drastic, a stricter
environmental policy, i.e. a higher tax rate in our model, plays the same role as an
increase in the level of potential competition in Aghion and Griffith’s (2005) model: it
makes the survival constraint of intermediate firms tighter; satisficing managers, who
fear to loose their job, respond by increasing the quality of intermediate inputs, which
reduces pollution. Furthermore, the higher tax rate increases downstream firm’s profit,
thus verifying the strong Porter hypothesis. We also examine the concomitant effect of
an increase in the level of potential competition in the intermediate sector. Section 4
concludes with further results then suggestions about possible extensions of the model.
2. The model
We use the R&D-driven endogenous growth model of Aghion and Griffith (2005) with
satisficing managers, which we extend to allow for pollution and environmental taxation
of producers in the final good market. Their two-period discrete model is a simplified
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version of the Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1997) analysis of the relationship between
competition, industrial policy and growth for two types of intermediate firms: firms in
which managers’ decisions regarding the size of innovation is to maximize profits and
firms in which managers maximize their private benefits net of innovation efforts. In
this paper we consider only the second type of firms. The growth rate of the economy
is an increasing function of the satisficing size of innovation, which itself is determined
by intermediate firms exploiting their market power against final good producers and
blocking entry of a less cost-effective fringe.
2.1 The competitive final good sector. One final nume´raire good yt is produced
competitively in period t according to the constant returns to scale production function
yt =
∫ 1
0
At(i)
1−αxt(i)αdi, 0 < α < 1, (1)
where the productivity parameter At(i) also measures the quality of the flow of interme-
diate input i at time t, xt(i).
We follow Nakada (2004) who assumes that pollution arises from the use of the x’s
in production of y. An environmental technology index zt(i) relates the quantities of
intermediate inputs to pollution. Unlike in Nakada (2004), however, zt(i) is endogenous;
it is inversely proportional to At(i), that is, zt(i) = 1/At(i).
3 The structural pollution
equation in each intermediate market i is therefore
zt(i)xt(i) =
xt(i)
At(i)
≡ Pt(i). (2)
Equation (2) is consistent with the argument of Nakada (2004) that the higher the index
(the lower the quality of i), the higher the level of pollution per unit of intermediate
input (Ricci, 2007a, p. 696 defines this ratio as pollution intensity).4 Environmental
policy takes the form of a unit tax identical across sectors, τt. The tax, which varies
directly as Pt(i), is paid by downstream firms to discourage pollution, as in Nakada
(2004).5 This assumption is different, e.g., from that of Hart (2004) who applies the unit
tax to output. Let the price of the ith intermediate input be pt(i). The representative
downstream firm’s profit pit(y) is:
yt −
∫ 1
0
pt(i)xt(i)di−
∫ 1
0
τtPt(i)di. (3)
For each intermediate input i, downstream firms maximize (3), given the technology in
(1), up to the point where marginal productivity α(xt(i)/At(i))
α−1 equals tax-inclusive
marginal cost pt(i) + τt(i)/At(i), which leads to the following inverse demand,
pt(i) = α(xt(i)/At(i))
α−1 − τt
At(i)
. (4)
We see that the unit tax on pollution shifts downward the demand schedule for the
intermediate good. We now turn to incumbent firms’ decisions in the intermediate sector.
3 In section 4 we consider the less restrictive assumption of imperfect negative correlation between z
and A (zt(i) = 1/At(i)
β).
4 Notice in equation (2) that there are no spillovers between sectors.
5 The average tax per unit of input τtPt(i)/xt(i) = τtzt(i) also varies directly as pollution intensity.
3
2.2 The decisions of monopolistically competitive intermediate firms. Incum-
bents make two related decisions: the quantity of x to sell to final good producers (regard-
less the degree to which this amount will degrade the environment). And, its managers
decide on the size of innovation γ, which we will define later. Incumbents produce x
from y according to the identity technology at a marginal cost of 1. In each intermediate
market i, a fringe could produce the same good at a higher marginal cost (of imitation)
χ > 1. Innovation is non-drastic (α−1 > χ).6 Incumbents exert their market power by
charging the limit price pt(i) = χ so as to prevent the fringe from entering their market.
Setting equation (4) equal to χ, the demand for intermediate input i is
xt(i) = α
1
1−α (χ+ τt/At(i))
1
α−1 At(i). (5)
Inserting equation (5) in (2), pollution is equal to:
Pt(i) = α
1
1−α (χ+ τt/At(i))
1
α−1 , (6)
which decreases with environmental regulation stringency, holding At(i) and all parame-
ters constant (∂Pt(i)/∂τt < 0).
Intermediate firms are self-financed. In addition to a unit marginal cost they incur
a fixed cost of production κAt−1(i) at the beginning of period t. Self-financing is not a
crucial assumption; we could, for instance, follow Aghion and Griffith (2005) who add
a debt repayment obligation to the model, dAt−1. More important are the assumptions
that κ is sufficiently large to allow for bankruptcy (κ > χ − 1) and that managers live
for one period. The value for profit net of the fixed cost of production in period t is
pit(i) = (pt(i) − 1)xt(i) − κAt−1(i). Under the previous assumption that intermediate
incumbents opt for limit pricing and using equation (5), pit(i) can be rewritten as:
pit(i) = (χ− 1)α 11−α (χ+ τt/At(i))
1
α−1 At(i)− κAt−1(i). (7)
Assuming that productivity evolves according to the first-order deterministic process
At(i) = γ(i)At−1(i), (8)
then inserting (8) in (7), one obtains:
pit(i) = [(χ− 1)α 11−α
(
χ+
τt
γ(i)At−1(i)
) 1
α−1
γ(i)− κ]At−1(i), ∀ 0 ≤ i ≤ 1. (9)
Unlike the Aghion and Griffith’s (2005, p. 38) model, in which there is no pollution
and thus no environmental regulation (τt ≡ 0), intermediate profits pit(i) are nonlinear
in γ(i) ∀ 0 ≤ i ≤ 1; thus, finding a solution which corresponds to incumbents’ decisions
on the size of innovation is not as simple as in Aghion and Griffith’s (2005) model where
the γ(i)’s are equal across intermediate markets.7
6 α−1 is the monopoly price incumbent intermediate firms would charge were innovation drastic
and environmental regulation absent. We solved the case of drastic innovation which we discuss in the
concluding section.
7 γ has i as argument because the At−1(i)’s are allowed to vary across markets.
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2.3 Satisficing managers and the size of innovation. Porter and van der Linde
(1995) suggest organizational inertia and lack of control over managers among the possible
constraints that intermediate firms’ owners will have to shift to comply with environmen-
tal policy. Interestingly, the Aghion and Griffith’s (2005) behavioural model of growth
assumes intermediate firms subject to organizational slack, although slack is not modeled
explicitly. We define slack as under-exploited managerial resources to increase innovation,
in the sense that managers enjoy private benefits (net of innovation efforts) greater than
the amount required to retain them within the firm. Managers, who fear to loose their
job, are mainly concerned with preserving their net benefit of control in intermediate
firms. The above definition of slack, which can be found in Nohria and Gulati (1996),
has a quantitative counterpart as we shall see in the next paragraph.
We now describe the decision of managers on the size of innovation. The private
benefit a manager gets from controlling the intermediate firm is B. And, B − γ is this
benefit net of innovation efforts. This difference is a simple version of managers’ objective
functions in Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1999). B is not included in the model of
Aghion and Griffith (2005) who consider a solution γ that results from equating equation
(9) to 0.8 We model the decision problem of satisficing managers regarding innovation
by solving the classical programming problem maxγ{B − γ : pi ≥ 0}, the solution of
which, γND (‘ND’ stands for ‘non-drastic’ innovation) is shown on Figure 1 below. It
lies on the thick profit curve pi (see the first part of Proposition 1 in Appendix A). If
managers choose a size γ < γND, then their net benefit of control increases but the firm
goes bankrupt (pi < 0). Whereas, if γ > γND, owners’ profit increases at the expense
of managers. The difference B − γND may be defined as a measure of organizational
slack in our model. If there were no organizational slack and managers had an outside
option which yields a net benefit of zero, then B would be the maximum innovation effort
and [(χ− 1)α 11−α (χ+ τt/BAt−1(i))
1
α−1 B − κ] ≡ p¯i would be the maximum profit firm i’s
owners could obtain.
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Figure 1. Satisficing size of innovation before the tax increase (γND) and after (γND
′
).
8 Actually, Aghion and Griffith (2005) assume B is sufficiently large that it can be ignored and
managers’ program can be written as a minimization of γ : pi = 0. Since there is no environmental
regulation in their model they obtain the simple solution κ
(χ−1)( χα )
1
α−1
, which is identical across markets.
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3. Effect of a stricter environmental policy
Predicting the strong Porter hypothesis in our model requires first finding that the in-
crease in τt, that is, a stricter environmental policy, reduces pollution (∂Pt/∂τt < 0) and
enhances innovation (∂γND/∂τt > 0; γ
ND′ > γND in Figure 1). These results are shown
as Proposition 2 and in the second part of Proposition 1 in Appendix A. In Proposition
3 we check that there is growth in the model and that the higher the tax rate, the higher
the growth rate ((yt − yt−1)/yt−1 > 0). The model should verify a fourth result: envi-
ronmental policy benefits firms. This result only needs to be verified for the final market
(∂pit(y)/∂τt > 0); the equilibrium value for profits in intermediate firms with satisficing
managers indeed equals 0 (see subsection 2.3). Proposition 4 below shows this result.
Poposition 4. A higher environmental tax rate increases downstream firms’ profit.
Proof. Using equations (2), (4) and the assumption pt(i) = χ, downstream profit can be
rewritten as:
pit(y) =
∫ 1
0
(
1− α
α
)
(χ+ τt/At(i))xt(i)di. (10)
Replacing xt(i) with the right hand side of (5), using (8) as well as the implicit profit
equation, one obtains the following reduced downstream profit equation:
pit(y) =
(
1− α
α
)(
κ
χ− 1
)∫ 1
0
(
χ+
τt
γND(τt, i)At−1(i)
)
At−1(i)di. (11)
To prove proposition 4, we differentiate equation (11) with respect to τt at point (τt, γ
ND(τt, i)).
But, ∂∂τt
(
τt
γND
)
> 0 as shown in Proposition 2. Therefore, ∂pit(y)∂τt =
(
1−α
α
) (
κ
χ−1
) ∫
∂
∂τt
(
τt
γND
)
is positive. ‖
Considered together, Propositions 1 to 4 verify the strong Porter hypothesis. From
equation (3), a higher tax rate increases τtPt(i), which has a direct negative effect on
downstream profit. The downstream firm responds by reducing its demand for interme-
diate inputs, which implies both lower output and lower production costs. The lower
demand also reduces the monopoly rent (χ− 1)xt(i) of incumbent intermediate firms, in
which managers react by increasing the size of innovation (Proposition 1). Thus, pro-
ductivity increases. Overall, the marginal change in the production function part of the
reduced profit equation is equal to 1α
(
κ
χ−1
) ∫
∂
∂τt
(
τt
γND
)
> 0 . Concerning the effect on
profit that operates through pollution, it is positive showing that a higher tax rate costs
more to final good producers at equilibrium (
(
κ
χ−1
) ∫
∂
∂τt
(
τt
γND
)
, is positive; see Proposi-
tion 2). This negative effect however is insufficient to overcome the direct positive effect
of a higher tax rate on production. Combining these results, we find that the loss in
downstream profit is more than offset by the general equilibrium effects.
Note that a stricter environmental policy does not impact costs of the competitive
fringe. This assumption is consistent with our initial assumption that marginal produc-
tion costs of incumbent intermediate firms is equal to unity and thus does not depend
on τt either. Of course, one may consider χ(τt) and examine the direction of the effect
of a change in τt. There are three cases: (a) χ
′ < 0, (b) χ′ = 0, (c) χ′ > 0. Case b is
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that we have considered so far. In cases a and c, the limit pricing strategy followed by
incumbent intermediate firms is not affected because pt(i) remains equal to χ(τt) regard-
less the functional form of the marginal cost χ(·). In case a the equilibrium value of x
increases because the lower χ has a negative effect on managers’ unit rent χ− 1 and on
owners’ profit pit(i) thus leading managers to increase innovation above γ
ND. Case c can
be interpreted by using symmetric reasoning.
We conclude this section with some discussion about whether competition policy inter-
feres with the win-win environmental policy. Let us assume a decrease in the cost of imi-
tation χ, which can be interpreted as an increase in the level of potential competition (see
Aghion and Griffith, 2005, p. 38).9 This change in χ actually reinforces the positive effect
of a stricter environmental policy on downstream firms’ profit (∂2pit(y)/∂(−χ)∂τt > 0).10
The main rationale for this is that a lower χ reduces the market power of intermediate
incumbent firms, which benefits producers in the final good market (∂pit(y)/∂(−χ) > 0).
But, ∂pit(y)/∂τt > 0 (Proposition 4). Thus, environmental policy and competition pol-
icy are complementary instruments in the sense that the former needs not be as strict
as before potential competition increased. The effect on pollution should also be con-
sidered separately. Aggregated pollution increases as the cost of imitation decreases
(∂Pt/∂(−χ) > 0). But, ∂Pt/∂τt < 0 as we showed in Proposition 2. Using tedious calcu-
lations shows that ∂2Pt/∂(−χ)∂τt < 0; thus, an increase in potential competition is not
detrimental to the more stringent environmental policy.
4. Concluding discussion
This paper extends the Aghion and Griffith’s (2005) model with satisficing managers
to allow for pollution and environmental taxation. Our theoretical results predict the
strong Porter hypothesis that a stricter environmental policy (a higher tax rate in our
model) improves growth, the environment and induces profitable innovations. We also
find that environmental policy and competition policy in the intermediate sector rein-
force each other. To check for robustness of these results, we consider several changes to
the model’s assumptions: innovation is large enough to create a monopoly, vertical inte-
gration, different regulations and some opportunity cost in R&D when targeting cleaner
innovations.11
Making the opposite assumption that innovation is drastic (the direction of the in-
equality α−1 > χ changes to α−1 < χ), the strong Porter hypothesis no longer holds
(proposition 4 is not verified). As shown in Appendix B, we need additional constraints
on the parameter set to maintain incumbent prices pt(i) below χ, the marginal cost of
the fringe. Under these assumptions, Propositions 1 to 3 are verified whereas Proposi-
tion 4 isn’t so because downstream profit, κ
α
∫ 1
0
At−1(i), although higher than that when
innovation is not drastic, does not depend on τt. Any extra rent from further innovation
following the tax increase is fully appropriated by intermediate incumbents and none of
it is transferred to owners whose satisficing managers increase innovation just enough
so that intermediate economic profit is zero. This lack of effect on downstream profit is
evidence of the weak Porter hypothesis. This result is also a consequence of the change in
9 The discussion below uses the result that ∂γND/∂χ < 0 which we deduce from the implicit function
theorem.
10 They are available upon request.
11 We thank the referees for having invited us to investigate these interesting situations. The former of
these situations is well documented in the remaining of the paper. Proofs regarding the other situations
are available upon request.
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the behavior of managers who maximize profit in the inputs markets. Thus, complying
with a more stringent environmental policy is not profitable when innovation is drastic
so that incumbent’s pricing is that of a pure monopoly. Considering vertically integrated
firms provides another interesting insight regarding the effect that market structure has
on our results. Assume that in each intermediate market, the vertically integrated firm
maximizes the sum of downstream profit At(i)
1−αxt(i)α − pt(i)xt(i) − τtPt(i) and in-
termediate incumbent’s rent (pt(i) − 1)xt(i) in each market i; we consider the cost of
production/innovation κAt−1(i) later when deriving the satisficing size of innovation. We
find that the size of the innovation is smaller than that under vertical separation, which
can be seen using the first part of Proposition 1 applied to the new implicit function,
say hV I(τt, γ). It can be shown that h
V I(τt, γ) > h(τt, γ), ∀γ, where h(τt, γ) which we
defined in Appendix A is the implicit function under vertical separation. It is such that
h(τt, γ
ND) = 0, which implies that hV I(τt, γ
ND) > 0. But, h and hV I are increasing in
γ. Consequently, γV I , which solves the implicit equation hV I(τt, γ) = 0 is less than γ
ND.
It is left for future research to examine the robustness of our results when we impose
vertical integration. Overall, increasing the market power of firms seem to narrow the
scope of the Porter hypothesis.
We also checked whether our results are valid for a different kind of regulation and
when intermediate incumbents pay the tax. In these cases, the model is more tractable.
First, considering a limit on the amount of pollution for each input (Pt(i) ≤ P¯ ) leads to
two solutions according to whether P¯ is greater or less than some threshold µ ≡ (χ/α) 1α−1 .
When the constraint is binding (P = P¯ ), we find solution γ¯ = κ
(χ−1)P¯ , which is constant
across markets. Besides, economic growth is equal to γ¯ − 1, which is greater than 0 and
increases with stricter regulation (P¯ decreases). Proposition 4 is also verified. These
results are slightly different if we consider a limit on the input-emission ratio (zt(i) ≤ z¯;
see, e.g., Verdier (1995)). All Propositions (except proposition 2) are verified in this
case. Pollution is not affected by regulation stringency; it is just equal to µ. Second, if
we modify the model by assuming that the government levies an environmental tax on
intermediate goods producers, we again find that pollution is not affected by regulation.
Thus, we do not find the strong Porter hypothesis in our model when intermediate firms
pay the tax. To summarize, regulating the input-emission ratio or taxing intermediate
firms lead to qualitatively similar results in that all propositions (except the second) are
true. Regulators should favor a limit on the amount of pollution as policy instrument.
We also examined the effect of assuming some opportunity cost in R&D when targeting
cleaner innovations, say zt(i) ≡ 1At(i)β , with β ∈ (0, 1) ( ∂z˜∂A Az˜ =−β>−1), our four propositions
hold. They also hold if we consider that targeting more ambitious innovation implies an
additional R&D cost, cγAt−1(i), in the intermediate profit. One conclusion we draw from
these results is that the scope of the strong Porter hypothesis is more sensitive to the
choice of policy instrument available to the regulator and market configuration than to
changes in the specification of the costs and the pollution equation.
We now discuss possible extensions of the model in the direction of addressing less
restrictively whether the assumption of profit maximizing firms is so crucial for the strong
Porter hypothesis. A first extension would be to introduce profit maximizing firms in the
intermediate sector. One approach to this would be to split the intermediate sector
between a fraction m of inputs produced by profit maximizing managers/firms and the
remaining inputs produced by satisficing managers. It is likely that a higher tax rate
will adversely affect profit maximizing firms in the short-term. Allowing these firms
the amount of the tax might solve the problem in the long-term. A second approach
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would be to divide the production of each intermediate input between the two types
of firms and make some assumption regarding how they compete with each other, as
in Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers (2001), and with the fringe. One could also
embed environmental policy in the more sophisticated model of Aghion, Dewatripont,
and Rey (1999) who consider an economy in which profit-maximizing firms and firms with
satisficing managers – who minimize their effort by delaying adoption of more efficient
innovations – co-exist. The general equilibrium analysis of their mixed economy, however,
is questionable. Equilibrium growth rate in the mixed economy is an ad hoc linear
and convex combination of growth rates of the two economies (with profit maximizing
managers or satisficing managers). In an ongoing research, we split the intermediate
sector between m < 1 profit-maximizing firms which monopolize intermediate markets
from 0 to m, and 1 −m conservative firms owning the remaining markets. Thus, there
is a one-to-one relationship between the number of firms of a given type and the number
of intermediate markets they own. Another possible extension would consist in allowing
for a more realistic agency problem with profit maximizing and managerial firms a` la
Scharfstein (1988). Quality A in non-profit maximizing firms would be affected by the
realization of a non-observable random Bernoulli variable. Only managers would observe
intermediate output, innovation and the value of the random shock. Intermediate firms’
owners would require managers to satisfy a single profit target and condition managers’
payment on output. This extension would have as advantage to preserve tractability of
our model.
9
References
Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont, and P. Rey (1997): “Corporate governance, compe-
tition policy and industrial policy,” European Economic Review, 41(3-5), 797–805.
Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont, and P. Rey (1999): “Competition, financial discipline
and growth,” Review of Economic Studies, 66(4), 825–52.
Aghion, P., and R. Griffith (2005): Competition and growth: reconciling theory and
evidence. The MIT Press.
Aghion, P., C. Harris, P. Howitt, and J. Vickers (2001): “Competition, imi-
tation and growth with step-by-step innovation,” Review of Economic Studies, 68(3),
467–492.
Aghion, P., and P. Howitt (1992): “A model of growth through creative destruction,”
Econometrica, 60(2), 323–51.
Ambec, S., and P. Barla (2007): “Survol des fondements the´oriques de l’hypothe`se
de Porter,” L’Actualite´ Economique, 83(3), 399–413.
Ambec, S., M. A. Cohen, S. Elgie, and P. Lanoie (2013): “The Porter hypothesis
at 20: can environmental regulation enhance innovation and competitiveness?,” Review
of Environmental Economics and Policy, 7(1), 2–22.
Andre´, J. F. (2015): “Strategic effects and the Porter hypothesis,” Working Papers
62237, MPRA.
Feichtinger, G., R. Hartl, P. Kort, and V. Veliov (2005): “Environmental pol-
icy, the Porter hypothesis and composition of capital: effects of learning and technolog-
ical progress,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 50(2), 434–446.
Hart, R. (2004): “Growth, environment and innovation – a model with vintages and
environmentally oriented research,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Man-
agement, 48(3), 1078–1098.
Hart, R. (2007): “Can environmental policy boost growth?,” in Sustainable Resource
Use and Economics Dynamics, ed. by S. Smulders, and L. Bretschger, chap. 4, pp.
53–70. Springer.
Jaffe, A., R. Newell, and R. Stavins (2002): “Environmental policy and techno-
logical change,” Environmental & Resource Economics, 22(1), 41–70.
Jaffe, A. B., and K. Palmer (1997): “Environmental regulation and innovation: a
panel data study,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 79(4), 610–619.
Mohr, R. (2002): “Technical change, external economies and the Porter hypothesis,”
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 43(1), 158–168.
Mohr, R., and S. Saha (2008): “Distribution of environmental costs and benefits,
additional distortion and the Porter hypothesis,” Land Economics, 84(4), 689–700.
Nakada, M. (2004): “Does environmental policy necessarily discourage growth?,” Jour-
nal of Economics, 81(3), 249–275.
10
Nohria, N., and R. Gulati (1996): “Is slack good or bad for innovation?,” Academy
of Management Journal, 29(5), 1245–1264.
Porter, M. (1996): “America’s green strategy,” in Business and the Environment, ed.
by R. Welford, and R. Starkey, chap. 4, pp. 33–35. Taylor and Francis.
Porter, M., and C. van der Linde (1995): “Toward a new conception of the
environment-competitiveness relationship,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4),
97–118.
Ricci, F. (2007a): “Channels of transmission of environmental policy to economic
growth: A survey of the theory,” Ecological Economics, 60(4), 688–699.
(2007b): “Environmental policy and growth when inputs are differentiated in
pollution intensity,” Environmental & Resource Economics, 38(3), 285–310.
Scharfstein, D. (1988): “Product-market competition and managerial slack,” RAND
Journal of Economics, 19(1), 147–155.
Verdier, T. (1995): “Environmental pollution and endogenous growth: a comparaison
between emission taxes and technological standards,” in Control and Game-Theoretic
Models of the Environment, ed. by C. Carraro, and J. Filar, pp. 175–200. Birkha¨user.
Xepapadeas, A., and A. de Zeeuw (1999): “Environmental policy and competitive-
ness: the Porter hypothesis and the composition of capital,” Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 37(2), 165–182.
11
Appendix
A Non-drastic innovation
Proposition 1 The size of innovation increases with the tax rate (∂γ
ND
∂τt
> 0).
Proof. Denoting 1
1−α by e then equating (9) to zero leads to the following implicit equation
γ − κ
χ− 1α
−e
(
χ+
τt
γAt−1(i)
)e
= 0. (A.1)
First, we show that a solution γND(τt) exists and differs across markets i ∈ (0, 1). Let
us denote the function at the left and side of equation (A.1) as h(τt, γ). It is continuous
an increasing in γ; limγ↓0 h(τt, γ) = −∞ and h is bounded above by B as γ tends to
B with limγ↑B h(τt, γ) =B− κχ−1α−e
(
χ+
τt
BAt−1(i)
)e
<B−κ. Furthermore, the partial derivative
∂h(τt, γ)/∂γ > 1. There exists a unique solution of (A.1). We remark that γ
ND > 1;
indeed, h(τt, 1) is one minus the product of three terms, each being greater than 1.
Therefore, h(τt, 1) is less than 0. But, h is increasing in γ, which suffices to prove that
solution γND > 1. Combining these results, h lies below the 45◦ line (see Figure 1 on
page 5) and is concave. We can use the implicit function theorem at point (τt, γ
ND(τt)).
We find ∂h(τt, γ)/∂γ = 1 + eτt/(χγAt−1(i) + τt); thus, the direction of the effect of an
increase in τt on γ is given by the sign of −∂h(τt, γ)/∂τt = eγ/(χγAt−1(i) + τt), which
is positive. Therefore, the curve h shifts to the right; it is steeper at the new solution
(γND
′
as indicated in Figure 1); consequently, γ increases as τt increases, which proves
Proposition 1. ‖
Proposition 2 Pollution decreases as the environmental tax rate increases (∂Pt
∂τt
< 0).
Proof. Using our definition for e, pollution in equation (6) can be written as αe
(
χ+
τt
γAt−1(i)
)−e
.
Its derivative at point (τt, γ
ND(τt)) has the same sign as
− ∂
∂τt
(
τt
γND
)
= − 1
γND
(
1− eτt
χγNDAt−1(i) + τt + eτt
)
< 0.
‖
Proposition 3 The growth rate of the economy (yt − yt−1)/yt−1 ≡ g is positive and
increases with τt.
Proof. To ease the exposition we remove the exponent ‘ND’. From the zero-profit con-
dition, xt(i) =
K
χ−1At−1(i) and xt−1(i) =
K
χ−1
At−1(i)
γ(τt)
. Using these results and denoting
Γ(τt, i) ≡ γ(τt)−αAt−1(i) and s(τt, i) ≡ Γ(τt,i)∫ Γ(τt,i)di , we can deduce ytyt−1 =
∫
s(τt, i)γ(τt, i)di,
which is a convex combination of the γ’s. But, γ > 1 (see the proof of Proposition 1).
Thus, yt
yt−1
, which is a convex combination of the γ’s, all greater than 1, is greater than
1 and g > 0, which proves the first part of Proposition 3.
Using the Leibniz’s rule, gτt is equal to∫
s
(
αγ
∫
(γτt/γ)Γ∫
Γ
+ (1− α)γτt
)
di,
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which is the integral of s times a convex combination of positive terms. It is positive,
thus showing the second part of Proposition 3. ‖
B Drastic innovation
Assuming innovation is drastic changes the direction of the inequality α−1 > χ to α−1 <
χ. We add two new assumptions, which are α2 > 1/χ and τt < αAt−1(i) ∀i. These
assumptions are sufficient conditions for α−1 < pDt (i) < χ. The first assumption implies
that of a drastic innovation (α2 > 1/χ ⇒ α−1 < χ). The second assumption sets an
upper bound for the value of the tax rate. Assuming that in its intermediate input
market i incumbent maximizes (pt(i) − 1)xt(i) with respect to xt(i), where the final
sector’s inverse demand is given by equation (4), we obtain the following quantity xDt (i) =
α
2
1−α (1 + τt/At(i))
1
α−1At(i), where ‘D’ stands for drastic, and corresponding monopoly
price pDt (i) = α
−1 + α−1(1− α)τt/At(i).
The size of innovation γD is determined by satisficing managers, γD : (pDt (i)−1)xDt (i)−
κAt−1(i) = 0 as in the case of non-drastic innovation with the difference that the economic
rent per unit of x, pD − 1 is endogenous. The implicit equation can be rewritten:
γ − eκα−(1+α)e
(
1 +
τt
γAt−1(i)
)eα
= 0, (B.1)
where e was already defined. To prove Proposition 1, we follow the same reasoning as
in Appendix A. We rewrite the function at the left hand side of (B.1) as hD(τt, γ). It is
increasing in γ. Using the assumptions α−1 < χ and κ > χ− 1 we can show that γD > 1.
Then we find ∂γD/∂τt= eαγ
D
γDAt−1(i)+τt+eατt
>0, using the implicit function theorem. Regarding
the effect of a more stringent policy on pollution, note first that
PDt (i) = x
D
t (i)/A
D
t (i) = α
2e
(
1
1 + τt/γDAt−1(i)
)e
. (B.2)
Differentiating (B.2) with respect to τt leads to a decrease in pollution; the proof follows
that of Proposition 2 in Appendix A. The derivative of PDt (i) at point (τt, γ
D(τt)) has
the same sign as
− ∂
∂τt
(
τt
γD
)
= − 1
γD
(
1− eατt
γDAt−1(i) + τt + eατt
)
< 0.
Proposition 3 still holds. Its proof is simpler than that when innovation is non-drastic,
for the ratio of outputs
yt
yt−1
=
∫ 1
0
At−1(i)di∫ 1
0
(γD(i))−1At−1(i)di
,
is greater than 1 and increases as τt increases. Proposition 4, however, is not verified
because downstream profit, pit(y) =
κ
α
∫ 1
0
At−1(i), does not depend on τt. Considered
together, these results verify the weak Porter hypothesis, which we define in the intro-
duction of the paper.
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